identifying what political theory is about and what it is for once we have a more sophisticated disciplinary identity. As the subject emerged in Britain in the last 150 years the role and nature of political theory -as distinct from a coherent and incrementally accumulating body of knowledge such as political science aspires to be -becomes both more confusing and more central to the preoccupations of political theorists. Unlike political scientists who argue about method but are still primarily concerned with data collection, analysis and hypothesis testing, political theorists seem to be consumed with the nature of their activity and how it connects to political science. This nervousness of purpose is partly because many of the dominant paradigms of U.S. political science, which cast their long shadow over the political studies community in Britain throughout the last sixty years, have been profoundly sceptical about the role and value of political theory especially where it makes normative claims. But normativity is not the only problem. As other areas of political science develop they identify a clear object of enquiry such as a country specialism, or else elections, party competition, executive and legislative politics or public policy analysis. At best political theorists can specialise in a thinker or a period -such as Bentham and utilitarianism (my own modest claim to fame). This of course makes us look remarkably like historians: scholars who are concerned with the thinkers or the politics of the past. Many political theorists have embraced the historian's challenge (associated with the late nineteenth century Cambridge legal scholar F.W.
Maitland that political science is history 'or it is humbug') and identify themselves as historians. This, in my view regrettable development, has been exacerbated by the Cambridge Trinity of John Pocock, John Dunn and Quentin Skinner. The so-called Cambridge school has had a hugely negative impact on the study of political thinkers from the past by rendering it either of merely antiquarian interest or frivolous. Although they would reject this characterisation of their impact, at least two of the Cambridge trinity (Skinner and Dunn) acknowledge the main the thrust of the charge and do make subtle uses of past thinkers for thinking about politics more generally in a less antiquarian fashion.
1 Their attempt to disconnect reflection on past political thinkers from reflection on politics and its languages, styles and limitations has left political theory with a greater sense of disconnection from the wider activity of political science. 
Breaking the spell of the 'giants'
It is not uncommon to find British scholars who lament the dominance of Rawls and
American rights-based conceptions of politics on British political thought and theory. Oakeshott bequeathed to his successors the concept of 'the rationalist' which they are determined to apply to anyone who attempts to engage in normative theorising or who supported the Labour party pre Tony Blair. To be a 'rationalist' is to be a 'system crazed'
planner, but it appears that everyone from Auguste Comte to contemporary theorists of justice are 'rationalists'. Rationalists confuse the contingencies of the present for some timeless philosophical insight into reality and end up causing chaos. There is obviously a kernel of truth in Oakeshott's characterisation and a salutary warning, but the concept is so broad it allows for no subtle distinctions nor for philosophical insights into how good normative theorising is distinguished from bad. All normative theorising is dismissed as a category mistake, but one that depends on a stipulative and controversial account of philosophy and politics. Of course Oakshottian anti-rationalism is itself a kind of rationalism, and as it was used by many of his followers it became a rationalism of the right. But from our perspective, its real danger was that it served as a smokescreen for closing down argument and debates. Many of the next generation of theorists inspired by
Oakeshott have attempted to bring his ideas to bear on contemporary debates by focusing on his theory of civil association, but that delivers little that can engage with the concerns of political scientists. What defines the subject of political philosophy is not some narrow concept of the political but a conception of analytical rigour and intellectual broadmindedness. He also recognised that good political theory cannot be wholly divorced from a sense of the past or the insights and resources that past thinkers provide us for making sense of the problems of the present. His work on Bentham is a model of how to read a past political thinker seriously, critically and insightfully.
Against normalisation
Many of those who would describe themselves as modern political philosophers will find much in Hart that resonates with their own concerns. What they might fail to recognise the extent to which they have narrowed the scope of political theory to speculation centred on the concept of justice. This is the so-called baleful influence of Rawls: the creation of a generation of scholars who think that the problem of justice exhausts the scope of political theory. 5 The predicament of modern political theory is not uncommon in a world in which normalisation is seen as a mark of disciplinary authority.
Normalisation involves the establishment of paradigmatic problems that give a central In the end what makes political theory interesting to many of those who practice it, is precisely the absence of a single determinate object of enquiry. Political theory and political theorists like to see themselves as the conscience of the discipline of political science by asking tough questions of the narrow scope of the concept of the political that the normal procedures of academic enquiry impose. The nature and site of politics is always ambiguous -this is not to deny that some sites like the state are more important than others -and it is the task of political theory to continually challenge attempts to delimit the scope of political enquiry and reflection.
Against gibberish
The conception of political theory outlined above suggests a form of enquiry that is constantly challenging attempts to fix its attention on a particular set of issues, problems or methods. Although I want to caution political theory from focusing too narrowly on issues of social justice, I do not, at the same time want to dismiss the importance of those questions, nor, more importantly do I want to collapse political theory into a form of perpetual and self-undermining critique. A prevalent, though not particularly profitable tendency among political theorists has been to ransack recent continental philosophy and French post-structuralism and post-Marxism for the theories, concepts and distinctions necessary to sustain political theory as a form of perpetual critique. My concern here is not to poke fun at the 'funny foreigners' and their strange ways. That is a prevalent and mistaken view in contemporary political science. Instead my concern is that this turn to the esoteric teaching of continental philosophers can become an excuse for meaningless word games or gibberish, or more importantly and equally destructively, it can become an intellectual cul-de-sac or a new kind of scholasticism. Too much of the attention of those who turn to continental discourses and idioms, is focused on defending the terms of critique and fostering the permanence of critique as if that were an end in itself. The critique of ideological forms and discourses of power is too often divorced from any more positive conception of the role and task of political theory. As such it is of ever diminishing interest to those who want to reflect on politics, much in the way that ever more technical discussions of egalitarianism have a diminishing marginal utility. Too much political theory written in this form is clever, obscure and selfserving: it is a viable way of passing the time in the face of the meaninglessness of the universe, but to be honest good novels, poetry and art (and perhaps football) are more edifying.
Reengaging with political science
In conclusion I want to sum up my agenda for political theory and suggest how it might abandoning the idea of categorical separation, the task of the political scientist and the political theorist can be brought together in ways that are both appropriate to the modern self-understanding, but which are also more true to the classical vision that we inherit from the great thinkers of the past.
